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EXONERATION CLAUSES IN WILLS AND
TRUST INSTRUMENTS
Robert Whitman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Exoneration clauses, also known as exculpatory or immunity
clauses, in wills and trust instruments have been the subject of con-
troversy for over two centuries. As early as 1785, the King's Bench
in England noted that exoneration clauses were "common clause[s]
of indemnity ... tak[ing] away that responsibility which each [trus-
tee] would be subject to . . . were it not for [the] clause . . ."
Judicial acceptance and implementation of these clauses in the
United States paralleled the industrial revolution and the advent of a
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the contributions to this article made by Alan J. Mittleman, Esq., member of the
Bar of Pennsylvania, and John Ivimey and Stephen Azia, recent graduates of the University of
Connecticut School of Law. The author would like in particular to thank Cynthia Rowen, a
student at University of Connecticut Law School, for her assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. Bartlett v. Hodgson, 99 Eng. Rep. 962, 962-63 (K.B. 1785). For other early cases
recognizing exoneration clauses, see Dawson v. Clarke, 34 Eng. Rep. 311 (1810); Pride v.
Fooks, 48 Eng. Rep. 1248 (M.R. 1839).
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"freedom to contract" legal philosophy.' Today, exoneration clauses
still widely appear in form books3 and are commonly drafted into
wills, trusts, and other documents.4
It is not surprising, because of our system of state-by-state law-
making, that these clauses are treated differently in various states.
Often the differences in legislative and court approaches can be dra-
matic.' In this article, the author questions whether such wide diver-
sity remains appropriate or helpful. An analysis of the case law
reveals that despite surface differences in the treatment of exonera-
tion clauses, there is a widespread consensus with regard to their
effectiveness. Also found is that often diverse legislative approaches
actually may hamper courts from reaching equitable results. Because
the results reached in cases arising throughout the U.S. are fairly
consistent, the author recommends the creation of a uniform national
rule to precisely define the scope of the effectiveness of exoneration
clauses and suggests a blueprint for this change.
II. EXONERATION CLAUSES: PURPOSE AND FORM
Exoneration clauses are drafted into wills and trust instruments
as a means of insulating the fiduciary from (1) the assertion of a
claim against him by an interested party, and (2) from an ultimate
finding of liability by a court for breach of fiduciary duty. One argu-
ment favoring liberal use of exoneration clauses suggests that, in the
absence of such a clause, fiduciaries who fear suit are likely to be
overly conservative in their investment and/or distribution policies.
Another argument suggests that groundless suits should not be en-
couraged. Indeed, a client may purposely request the draftsperson to
include an exoneration clause in an instrument, in order to persuade
a cautious person, or someone with limited experience, to undertake
service as a fiduciary, or to induce that person to exercise broader
and, hopefully, more beneficial discretion.
One argument in favor of restricting the effectiveness of an ex-
2. Cf. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism 19 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 251-53 (1975); see
also W, FRIEDMANN. Legal Theory 140-43, 400-01 (1967) (discussing the theoretical develop-
ment of individual rights).
3. See Exculpatory Clauses - Their Legal Significance, I REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
530, 541 (1966) (appendix of which contains a large collection of exoneration clauses and cites
numerous specific form books),
4. See generally A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS §222 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter SCOTT]; G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §542 (1978)
[hereinafter BOGERT].
5. See infra pp. 125-26.
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oneration clause points out that often a draftsperson may include a
clause without adequately explaining its impact to the client, or
without even appraising her of its inclusion. The draftsperson may in
fact be closely allied with a corporate, or other, fiduciary who wants
to be protected from liability through the inclusion of an exoneration
clause. In a worst case scenario, the creator of the instrument will
not even be aware of the fact that the clause has been included.
For purposes of this article, our concern is primarily with a
clause which directly relieves the fiduciary of liability, such as when
exculpation occurs by raising the level of culpability required in or-
der to surcharge the fiduciary. An example of this type of clause
would read: "No trustee shall ever be liable for any act of omission
or commission unless such act is the result of gross negligence or of
bad faith or of the trustee's own defalcation . . . ." Other similar
clauses might speak of exemption from liability for ordinary negli-
gence, mistakes, errors in judgment and gross negligence.7
A second, less direct method for limiting the liability of a fiduci-
ary would be the use of a clause that expands the range of the fiduci-
ary's acceptable actions.8 For example, a clause could expand invest-
ment alternatives to include the right of the fiduciary to invest in
speculative securities.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE RANGE OF ACCEPTANCE OF
EXONERATION CLAUSES
Either by state statute or case law, legislative and judicial atti-
tudes towards permitting exoneration clauses have appeared to range
from restrictive to liberal positions."
A position referred to as restrictive is one which specifically pro-
hibits the use of an exoneration clause. This view prevents the court
from considering underlying facts in making a determination regard-
6. Langford v. Shamburger, 417 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
7. See BOGERT, supra note 4; see also Corpus Christi Nat'l Bank v. Gerdes, 551 S.W.2d
521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (applying an exoneration clause that expressly included plain negli-
gence, mistakes, and errors in judgment even where the trustee had been grossly negligent). It
is conceivable than an exoneration clause might expressly exempt from liability a grossly negli-
gent fiduciary, but this type of exoneration clause is less likely to be given full effect, especially
in light of the recent trend towards moderate review within extreme states. See infra p. 149.
8. See ScoTT, supra note 4, § 222.1. Courts generally do not distinguish between meth-
ods of exoneration; rather, a court will focus on the scope and effect of the various exoneration
clauses. For an example of actual testamentary language that employs the alternate method of
exoneration, see In re Will of Allister, 144 Misc. 2d 994, 997, 545 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (Sur.
Ct. 1989).
9. See infra pp. 126-146.
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ing whether or not to enforce an exoneration clause. The most ex-
treme regulation of exculpatory provisions in this manner has been
by statute in New York.10
Section 222 of the Restatement of Trusts"1 is an example of a
moderate approach where fiduciaries are permitted to be exculpated
within pre-set bounds. Those pre-set bounds tend to draw the bound-
ary for acceptable clauses at those clauses which allow for negli-
gence by the fiduciary, but not gross negligence, recklessness, or in-
tentional misconduct."2 In jurisdictions following this moderate
approach, exoneration clauses that attempt to exculpate fiduciary
culpability greater than negligence are often invalidated by statute
or court decision. s
States that have adopted the Uniform Trusts Act, Pennsylvania
and Texas, are in sharp contrast since they have enacted a statutory
approach which is liberal in its allowance of the use of exoneration
clauses." In these jurisdictions, courts do not often invalidate exon-
eration clauses. Exoneration clauses in Texas have even been found
to be protective of gross negligence by a corporate fiduciary, 15 al-
though, as will be seen below, this is not the norm.
After considering the outcomes of cases which have arisen in
many jurisdictions, the author concludes that courts in jurisdictions
governed by moderate statutes have the widest latitude to decide
cases based upon the equities present in the actual fact patterns.
These jurisdictions need not rationalize a proper decision in order to
fit an overriding restrictive or liberal statutory pattern.
IV. COMPARISON OF THE RESTRICTIVE AND LIBERAL STATUTORY
POSITIONS
A. The Restrictive Position - New York
New York, by statute, adopts a most restrictive approach to the
use of an exoneration clause. New York State's Estates, Powers and
Trusts Law, section 11-1.7, reads in part:
(a) The attempted grant to an executor or testamentary trustee, or
the successor of either, of any of the following enumerated powers
or immunities is contrary to public policy:
.10. See infra pp. 126-131.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §222 (1959) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
12. See RESTATEMENT §222 comments a, b.
13. See infra p. 149.
14. See infra pp. 131-34.
15. See infra pp. 140-41.
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(1) The exoneration of such fiduciary from liability for fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care, diligence and prudence.
2) The power to make a binding and conclusive fixation of
the value of any asset for purposes of distribution, allocation
or otherwise.
(b) The attempted grant in any will of any power or immunity in
contravention of the terms of this section shall be void but shall not
be deemed to render such will invalid as a whole, and the remain-
ing terms of the will shall, so far as possible, remain effective.
(c) Any person interested in an estate or trust fund may contest the
validity of any purported grant of any power or immunity within
the purview of this section without diminishing or affecting ad-
versely his interest in the estate or trust, any provision in any will
to the contrary notwithstanding. 16
EPTL section 11-1.7 has been strictly construed by the New
York courts. For example, in the case In re Lang's Will, 7 the surro-
gate's court held that- a paragraph in a will which prohibited the
beneficiaries from questioning the trustee as to the management and
administration of the testamentary trust violated EPTL section 11-
1.7.18
New York courts have continued this strong enforcement of the
statute. In two cases, In re Allister" and Estate of Lubin, 0 the New
York courts demonstrate a willingness to enforce the statutory provi-
sions by not giving effect to exoneration clauses to the extent that
they go beyond the limits allowed by the New York statute.
In In re Allister, Joan Krosner, the second successor trustee of a
testamentary trust created by the decedent, sought judicial settle-
ment of her account in the surrogate's court and moved for summary
16. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRuss LAW §11-1.7 (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter EPTL].
17. 60 Misc. 2d 232, 302 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
18. The petitioners were beneficiaries of Lang's testamentary trust. Petitioners wanted
both an accounting from the trustees and the right to generally question the trustee's manage-
ment. Paragraph Eighth of the will was a forfeiture clause which specifically prohibited any
interference with or questioning of the trustees. The will also prohibited bringing action for the
partition of, or to question title to, any property held by the trust. The penalty for a beneficiary
engaging in the prohibited conduct was loss of status as a beneficiary of the trust. The Court
found that Paragraph Eighth, and paragraphs like it, were void under EPTL § 11-1.7, stating:
"As concerns the obvious attempt by the testator under Paragraph Eighth of the will to pro-
hibit the beneficiaries of the testamentary trust from questioning the trustees as to the man-
agement and administration of the trust. . .[it] is clearly violative of public policy and appli-
cable statutory law."
Id. at 233-34, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56.
19. 144 Misc. 2d 994, 545 N.Y.S;2d 483 (Sur. Ct. 1989).
20. 143 Misc. 2d 121, 539 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sur. Ct. 1989).
1992]
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judgment on the issue of her liability."' The decedent's son, H.M.
Allister, was named as the beneficiary of the trust, but had recently
died.2 Objections to the accounting were filed by the executor of
H.M. Allister's estate. He claimed that Krosner breached her fiduci-
ary duty by not making productive use of, and ultimately selling at a
loss, the trust corpus: a piece of commercial property and stock in a
realty corporation.23
Krosner argued that the trust instrument exonerated her from
liability for loss resulting from her retention of the property and
stock. Article Six, Paragraph Two of the trust allowed the trustee to
retain any property within the Estate "in his uncontrolled discretion.
.without liability for any decrease in value thereof... ." Para-
graph Three of Article Six allowed the trustee to invest "irrespective
of whether the same may be authorized by the laws of the State of
New York ... and without any restrictions placed upon fiduciaries
by any present or future applicable law, rule or court or court deci-
sion."125 The surrogate's court, finding that both paragraphs violated
EPTL section 11-1.7 and were offensive to public policy, denied
Krosner's motion for summary judgment.2
In In re Lubin, the attorney who drafted a will which nominated
him as both the executor and trustee, petitioned to have the will sub-
mitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court, Bronx County.27 The will
contained an exoneration clause exculpating the executor from negli-
gence, but not "fraud, misconduct, or gross negligence."28 Perhaps
on its own motion,29 the court invalidated the exoneration clause. In
dicta, the court stated that if this attorney had intentionally inserted
an invalid exoneration clause into the testamentary trust instrument
and had failed to inform the beneficiaries that this clause was a
"toothless tiger",30 the fiduciary's action would also be in violation of
21. Allister, at 995, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 996, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The property was located in Freeport, N.Y.. It was
rented for the first eight months of 1974, then remained vacant until it was sold in 1984 at a
loss of $2,643.17. The stock was sold in 1982, eight years after its distribution into the trust, at
a loss of over $7,800. Id., 545 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
24. Id. at 997, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
25. Id., 545 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
26. Id. at 998, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87.
27. Lubin, at 121-22, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
28. Id. at 122, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
29. In the opinion, it is unclear whether an opposing party filed objections to the petition
to admit the will to probate or whether the court refused to admit the will on its own motion.
30. Lubin, at 122, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
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the Code of Professional Responsibility.31 However, since this partic-
ular attorney was inexperienced in the area of trusts, his actions
were found to be unintentional and, -therefore, not unethical.3 2 More-
over, the court deemed the will valid but the exoneration clause void
as against public policy.33
While consistently upholding EPTL section 11-1.7 in the con-
text of exoneration clauses in wills or testamentary trusts, the New
York courts have, in contrast, read the statute narrowly as applying
only to "an executor or testamentary trustee."3' For example, the
Surrogate's Court in In re Sherman's Estate" held that EPTL sec-
tion 11-1.7 did not apply to a trustee of an inter vivos trust.36 In
Sherman, the executor of Sherman's estate petitioned for a judicial
settlement of the account. Sherman's widow filed objections.3 7 Sher-
man and his brother were both shareholders in a closed corporation
through which they did business." Before his death, Sherman en-
tered into an agreement with his brother which gave one of them,
upon the other's death, the option to purchase the deceased brother's
stock. 9 The agreement included clauses exonerating the executor of
Sherman's estate from liability for failure to enforce the agreement
and gave the executor broad discretion in deciding whether or not to
enforce that agreement. Sherman's will and codicil mentioned the
agreement between the brothers and reiterated the exoneration
clauses.'
The widow argued that EPTL section 11-1.7 voided the exoner-
ation clauses and that the clauses were contrary to public policy and,
therefore, the entire agreement between Sherman and his brother
was void.41 In finding for the executor, the Surrogate's Court held
that both the agreement and the exoneration clauses were valid."
The court characterized the agreement between the brothers as a
separate inter vivos contract whose mention in the will did not affect
31. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102 (1989).
32. Lubin, at 122, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
33. Id., 539 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
34. EPTL §I 1-1.7.
35. 141 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
36. Id. at 792.
37. Id. at 791.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41, Id.
42. Id. at 792.
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the executor's duty."8
Similarly, in the case O'Hayer v. De St. Aubin," the New York
Appellate Division validated the language of the powers provisions of
an inter vivos trust which permitted extensive self-dealing on the ra-
tionale that EPTL section 11-1.7 has no application to a living
trust.'5
In one frequently cited New York decision, In re Cowles'
Will,4" the New York Appellate Division even cited Restatement
section 222'1 as the proper standard for reviewing exoneration
clauses in inter vivos trusts."
43. Id.
44. 30 A.D.2d 419, 293 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1968).
45. In O'Hayer, Ovide de St. Aubin, Sr. created an inter vivos trust, naming himself and
his son, Ovide, Jr., as trustees and beneficiaries, and his daughter, Lorraine O'Hayer, as a
beneficiary. Two corporations comprised the corpus of the trust. The trust was to be termi-
nated upon the death of both Ovide, Sr. and Ovide, Jr. The trust instrument declared that it
was the strong intent of the settlor that both he and Ovide, Jr. profit from the trust. Id. at 421,
293 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
The daughter, Lorraine O'Hayer, appellant and original plaintiff, brought suit against the
executors of Ovide, Jr.'s estate requesting that the estate be surcharged for various breaches of
trust committed by Ovide, Jr. At issue were various self-dealings by Ovide, Jr., including buy-
ing from the trust just enough stock to become a majority stockholder over his sister, taking
loans from the trust funds which caused the trust to borrow at higher interest rates, and ar-
ranging a contract between his own personal corporation, Tahoma Mills, Inc., and L&L, a
subsidy of Vesta, so that Vesta paid Tahoma large sums of money. The court did not allow the
latter two dealings, demanded an accounting of the loans made to Ovide, Jr. from the trust
corpus, and surcharged Ovide, Jr. all of the assets from Tahoma Mills. However, the court
upheld Ovide, Jr.'s purchase of Vesta Corporation and Vesta Underwear stock from the trust
corpus. The court explained that it was the blatant and specific intention of Ovide, Sr., as
evidenced by the language of the trust instrument, that Ovide, Jr. be able to purchase the
stock and that this language properly exonerated Ovide, Jr. from liability for what would have
otherwise been a breach of the duty not to self-deal. Id. at 423-24, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52.
46. 22 A.D.2d 365, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1965).
47. RESTATEMENT §222 represents the moderate position regarding the court enforce-
ment of exoneration clauses. See infra p. 146.
48. The trusts in question were two inter vivos trusts created by a married couple. The
trust created by Louise Cowles named her husband, Russel, as the primary life beneficiary.
Russel Cowles' trust named Louise as the primary life beneficiary. The Bank of New York
was named trustee for both trusts and this proceeding was initiated by the bank in order to
obtain a judicial settlement of its accounts. Objections were filed by two beneficiaries of the
trusts, Elizabeth Cowles Harris and Marcia Cowles Platt, granddaughters of Louise and Rus-
sel Cowles. Id. at 367-68, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 163-65.
The objections to the bank's administration of the trust revolved around investments made
by the bank which resulted in a total loss. Between 1917 and 1921, the bank purchased stock
in the Ansonia Clock Company at the request of Russel Cowles. The stock began to decline in
1928, and the bank then sold the Ansonia stock and purchased Tork Clocks, Inc. stock. Id. at
374-75, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71.
The court found that the stock purchase was a prudent investment because Russel Cowles
had suggested and approved of the purchase, and because Cowles was the vice president of the
[Vol. 4:123
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Perhaps the unwillingness of the New York courts to expand
upon the literal language of the statute reflects a simple exercise in
judicial restraint."" However, it should be noted that there is a defi-
nite absence of legislative response to these cases. Given the ex-
panding practice of using living trusts for lifetime and estate plan-
ning purposes," can the courts' decisions, taken together with the
legislature's failure to act, be read as a clear change in attitude from
the original legislative conviction in New York that exculpatory
clauses need to be strongly curtailed?
B. The Liberal Statutory Position - The Uniform Trusts Act,
Pennsylvania, and Texas
1. Overview
As compared to New York, the states in which the Uniform
Trusts Act5 1 is now in force, Pennsylvania and Texas, fall at the
other end of the spectrum of attitudes concerning exoneration
clauses. All of these states have promulgated a very liberal, non-re-
strictive statutory regulation of exoneration clauses; however, some
courts in these jurisdictions have interpreted these liberal statutes
restrictively. 2
The Uniform Trusts Act was first adopted by the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Asso-
ciation in 1937. 53 Official comments to the Act indicate that its crea-
tion was first suggested by the American Bankers Association and
guided by advice given by the Trust Division of the Bankers Associa-
tion.5 4 Given the extensive involvement of the Bankers Association,
company. Further, the court gave effect to the exoneration clauses in the trust instruments,
citing Restatement §222 and stating: "In light of the facts as they appear in the record and
were heretofore discussed, there is no basis for a finding of willful negligence, self-dealing or
bad faith on the part of the trustee in any of the questioned transactions."
Id. at 378, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
49. Cf. Clymer v. Mayo, 393 Mass. 754, 43 N.E.2d 1084 (1985) (statute revoking will
disposition on divorce was extended by the court to cover revocation of disposition in power
over trust.); C. ANTIEAU, ADJUDICATING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES §10.22 (1985) (describing
deference to Congress given by U.S. Supreme Court); see also R. JOHNSTON, THE EFFECT OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED
STATES 47-97 (1969).
50. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984).
51. UNIF. TRUSTS ACT, 7B U.L.A. 763 (1937) [hereinafter ACT].
52. See infra pp. 136-38 & 142-45.
53. ACT, 7B U.L.A. 763 (1937).
54. See id. at 763.
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an organization which represents corporate fiduciaries, it should not
be surprising that the drafters of the Act endorsed a relaxed ap-
proach towards regulation of exoneration clauses. The pertinent sec-
tion of the Act reads:
The settlor of any trust affected by this Act may . . . relieve his
trustee from any or all of the duties, restrictions, and liabilities
which would otherwise be imposed upon him by this Act ... but no
act of the settlor shall relieve a trustee from the duties, restrictions,
and liabilities imposed upon him by sections 3 [loaning of trust
funds to self or affiliate], 4 [corporate trustees depositing trust
funds with self], and 5 [trustee buying from or selling to self] of
this Act.55
Presently, only six states and one territory are governed wholly,
or in part, by the Act:56 Louisiana,57 Nevada, 58 New Mexico,61
North Carolina," Oklahoma, 1 South Dakota,62 and the Virgin Is-
lands.6 3 In the jurisdictions which have the Act, section 17 has been
adopted almost verbatim, with a few interesting exceptions."
55. ACT, §17, 7B U.L.A. 787-88 (1937).
56. The foregoing list appears in the official comments to the Uniform Trusts Act. See
AcT, 7B U.L.A. at 763.
57. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1725, 9:2062-63, 9:2065, 9:2084-86, 9:2112, 9:2114,
9:2122, 9:2124-26, 9:2196, 9:2207-08 (West 1991). The statute pertaining to exoneration
clauses is LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2206 (West 1991) and no longer follows the Uniform
Trusts Act. Section 9:2206 repealed LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2035 (West Appendix 1991),
which did follow the Uniform Trusts Act model.
58. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 163.010 - 163.210 (Michie 1986). The statute pertaining to
exoneration clauses is NEV. REV. STAT. § 163.160 (Michie 1986).
59. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-2-1 - 19 (Michie 1989). The statute pertaining to exonera-
tion clauses is N.M. STAT. ANN. §46-2-14 (Michie 1989).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-60 - 84 (1991). The statute pertaining to exoneration
clauses is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-78 (1984).
61. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 175.1 - .23 (West 1971). The statute pertaining to
exoneration clauses is OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.21 (West 1971).
62. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 55-4-1 - 55-4-36 (1990). The statute pertaining to
exoneration clauses is S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 55-4-30 (1988).
63. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1091 - 1111 (1967). The statute pertaining to exoneration
clauses is V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §1107 (1967).
64. North Carolina omits the language "his trustee from any or all duties, restrictions,
and..." from its statute, so that the language in the North Carolina statute reads: "The
settlor . may . relieve liabilities which would otherwise be imposed upon [the trustee] by
this Act." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-78 (1984). The effect, if any, of this change is unclear
because the statute has not been construed in reported case law.
Oklahoma restricts its prohibition of exoneration for self-dealing only to corporate trust-
ees. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.21 (West 1991). This is one of the few instances
where, by statute, the legislature held corporate trustees to a higher standard of conduct than
individual trustees in spite of the fact that commentators have been suggesting the use of a
[Vol. 4:123
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Pennsylvania has not adopted the Uniform Trusts Act, but has
had a liberal exoneration statute since 1949. The pertinent section
reads, in part:
The testator or settlor in the instrument establishing a trust may
prescribe the powers, duties, and liabilities of the fiduciary regard-
ing the investment or noninvestment of principle and income and
the acquisition ... and disposition of ... any property which...
shall come into his control; and whenever any such provision shall
conflict with this chapter, such provision shall control not with-
standing this chapter .... 5
Despite the seemingly limitless power given to the settlor of a trust
to exculpate his or her trustee, the Pennsylvania courts have consist-
ently imposed restrictions on the effect of exoneration clauses, bring-
ing Pennsylvania, by case law, to a moderate position.6
The most recent enactment of a liberal statute regulating exon-
eration clauses occurred in Texas in 1983. In 1943, Texas had
adopted the Uniform Trusts Act as part of the Texas Trust Act.67 At
that time, section 17 of the Uniform Trusts Act was adopted almost
verbatim, except that in the Texas statute, corporate trustees would
not be exculpated for self-dealing although individual trustees were
not subject to the same restriction." In 1983, the Texas legislature
repealed the Trust Act, but passed a sweeping statute that gives the
creator of the instrument as much freedom' to exonerate the fiduciary
as the creator had under the old Texas Trust Act." The new statute,
Texas Property Code section 113.059, reads:
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, the settlor
by provision in an instrument creating, modifying, amending, or
revoking the trust may relieve the trustee from a duty, liability, or
restriction imposed by this subtitle.
(b) A settlor may not relieve a corporate trustee from the duties,
higher standard for corporate fiduciaries since the 1930's. See infra pp. 159-162 for a more
thorough discussion; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.059 (West 1991) (also holding
corporate fiduciaries to a higher standard of conduct).
Louisiana, in its enactment, kept most of the Uniform Trusts Act but repealed its statute
coinciding with § 17 of the Act. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2035 (West 1991). Louisiana now
takes a more moderate statutory approach to the policing of exoneration clauses. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2206 (West 1991); infra notes 201-234 and accompanying text.
65. PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7319(a) (Purdon '1975).
66. See infra notes 92-115 and accompanying text.
67. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-1-47 (Vernon 1960).
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-22 (Vernon 1960) (repealed 1984).
69. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.059 (Vernon 1984).
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restrictions, or liabilities of Section 113.052 or 113.053 of this
act. 7
0
2. Analysis of Case Law Under the Uniform Trusts Act
Even though the statutes based on the Uniform Trusts Act were
enacted decades ago, very few reported cases have construed them.
However, from the few cases that have been reported it appears that
the courts in jurisdictions which follow the Act give deference to the
original legislative intent of the framers of the Act. In general, the
reported cases reflect the courts' unwillingness to intrude and possi-
bly curb trustees acting under the safeguard of an exoneration
clause, so long as it appears to the court that the trustee was at-
tempting in good faith to properly carry out the fiduciary function.
In particular, where close family relationships are involved, the
courts adopt a policy of not policing family matters unless fraud or
bad faith is shown. 1
For example, in Newman v. Morris,72 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court sustained a demurrer, thereby exonerating a trustee from al-
leged liability based, in part, on the fact that the trustee was the
wife of the beneficiary and appeared to be acting in good faith. Phyl-
lisjean Newman was the trustee of a revocable trust created by her-
self and her then husband, Warren Morris.73 The corpus of the trust
was comprised of three lots of land, A, B and C, situated in north-
west Oklahoma City.7" Faced with an unproductive corpus and a
possible default of the first mortgage for all three lots, Newman and
Morris negotiated a deal with Downing & Jackson, an unaffiliated
corporation, wherein Downing & Jackson refinanced the mortgage of
all three lots and financed construction of a gas station on lot C.7 ' In
return, Newman, as trustee, unconditionally conveyed lots B and C
to Downing & Jackson to use as collateral until Downing & Jackson
recouped their investment plus an additional agreed-upon return.70
Years later, after Newman and Morris had divorced, Morris sued
Downing & Jackson for reconveyance and sued Newman charging
70. Id. Sections 113.052 and 113.053, respectively, deal with the loaning of trust funds
to a trustee and the purchase or sale of trust property by a trustee.
71. See, e.g., Newman v. Morris, infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text; see also
Bank of Nevada v. Speirs, infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
72. 574 P.2d 615 (Okla. 1977).
73. Id. at 615.
74. Id. at 615-16.
75. Id. at 616.
76. Id.
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breach of fiduciary duty for failure to compel Downing & Jackson to
reconvey." The original revocable trust was terminated by written
instructions of Newman and Morris, as trustors; in those instruc-
tions, the preceding acts of Newman, as trustee, were ratified and
exoneration was given to Newman from all liability arising out of
any of Newman's acts as trustee .7 The trial court failed to reach the
question of the exoneration clause and sustained Newman's demur-
rer, because it found that there was no property in the trust that
Newman could have reconveyed.1
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained Newman's
demurrer and held that even if there was property to reconvey and
Newman had breached her fiduciary duty, the exoneration clause
was valid and absolved Newman from all liability.80 The court noted
that there did not appear to be any fraud or abuse of the fiduciary
relationship on the part of Newman, suggesting that, had the facts
been otherwise, the court might have been willing to invalidate the
exoneration clause.81
In Bank of Nevada v. Speirs,82 the Supreme Court of Nevada
upheld an exoneration clause in a trust instrument based, in part, on
the court's policy not to police family matters in the absence of fraud
or bad faith. Karen Speirs was the beneficiary of a testamentary
trust created by her mother, Lena Coulthard. 3 Lena Coulthard
owned stock in the Silvagni Estate Co., which owned the Horseshoe
Building in Las Vegas and some real estate. " Lena bequeathed half
of her stock and land to her husband, G. William Coulthard, and the
other half to G. William Coulthard, in trust for their daughter
Karen.88 The trust instrument did not contain a classic exoneration
clause, but did contain a clause allowing G. William Coulthard, as
trustee, complete discretion in investing the trust corpus.8
Coulthard purchased five Iowa farms for the trust which, prior
to the termination of the trust, were sold at a substantially higher
77. Id.
78. Id. at 617.
79. Id. at 616.
80. Id. at 617.
81. Id. at 617.
82. 95 Nev. 870, 603 P.2d 1074 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
83. Id. at 872, 603 P.2d at 1075.
84. Id., 603 P.2d at 1075.
85. Id., 603 P.2d at 1075.
86. Id., 603 P.2d at 1075.
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price.817 Coulthard also purchased additional interests in the Horse-
shoe Properties for himself but not for the trust.8 8 Karen Speirs sued
the Bank of Nevada as executor of G. William Coulthard's estate,
charging Coulthard with breach of fiduciary duty for purchasing the
Iowa farms and for failing to purchase additional Horseshoe stock
for the trust while purchasing the stock for himself. The district
court agreed with Karen Speirs, finding that Coulthard had acted
improperly as trustee.8'
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed, finding G.
William Coulthard neither negligent in his investments nor self-deal-
ing in his personal purchase of additional Horseshoe stock.90 The
court deferred to the broad discretion given the trustee by the trust
instrument, stating:
This broad grant of authority, this testamentary exoneration of the
trustee for mistakes, if any, must be accorded respect by a court.
This would seem especially true in a family setting where it is ap-
parent that the wife-mother wanted the husband-father to have ab-
solute control of the trust established for the benefit and care of
their daughter, knowing that he would act with love and care. 1
The underlying assumption on the part of the courts in the two
cases above appears to have been that the creators had good reason
to want to exonerate their trustees; they had faith in the trustees and
assumed that the trustees would be honest in their administration of
the trusts.
3. Analysis of Case Law Under the Pennsylvania Statute
Despite a very non-restrictive Pennsylvania statute,'2 the Penn-
sylvania courts have consistently and uniformly placed moderate
controls over the effectiveness of exoneration clauses. As early as
1938 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the standard established
by the Restatement section 222,' 8 which represents a moderate posi-
tion with regard to the control by the courts of exoneration clauses.'4
87. Id. at 873, 603 P.2d at 1076.
88. Id. at 872-73, 603 P.2d at 1075-76.
89. Id. at 873, 603 P.2d at 1076. For a description of the trial court's holding, see Bank
of Nevada, 95 Nev. at 870, 603 P.2d at 1074.
90. Id. at 873-74, 603 P.2d at 1076-77.
91. Id. at 873, 603 P.2d at 1076.
92. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7319 (1975).
93. See, e.g., Gouley v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 329 Pa. 465, 198 A. 7 (1938).
94. See infra notes 185-192 and accompanying text.
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Whereas the liberal position taken by the Pennsylvania statute would
suggest that there should be little or no court regulation over the use
of an exoneration clause, the moderate position, reflected by the Re-
statement, would guide a court towards not permitting the use of an
exoneration clause to shield a fiduciary who was guilty of gross neg-
ligence or intentional misconduct.
In Gouley v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 95 plaintiff Gouley
was a class "A" bondholder and, representing herself and other
bondholders, sued the Land Title Bank & Trust as trustees.9 6 Land
Title Bank & Trust administered a piece of commercial property
placed in one of their trusts and sought to secure a corporate mort-
gage on the property through the issuance of bonds.0 7 Gouley
brought suit to surcharge the trustees for losses sustained by the
bondholders allegedly caused by breaches of trust.9 8 The mortgage
for the commercial property was to be repaid from 1923 to 1933.79
The mortgage payments had ceased in 1925.100 Gouley bought her
bond in 1929 with no notification that the mortgage had been in
default for four years. 1 Gouley argued that the failure to notify her
of the mortgage prior to her purchase of the bond constituted a con-
cealment of the default and a willful breach of fiduciary duty. 102 De-
fendant trustees argued that the security company was the sole agent
for the bondholders, that the security company was notified of the
default, and that Gouley's failure to be notified was the security
company's fault.103
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the trial court's de-
cision In favor of the trustees. 10 The court found that the mortgage
instrument did not require the trustees to notify the bondholders di-
rectly, unless the bondholders requested such a notification, which
they did not.105 The court also approved of an exculpatory clause in
the mortgage document which protected the trustees from any liabil-
ity except for willful and intentional breaches of trust.106 In the
95. 329 Pa. 465, 198 A. 7 (1938).
96. Id. at 467, 198 A. at 8.
97. Id., 198 A. at 8.
98. Id. at 468, 198 A. at 8.
99. Id. at 467, 198 A. at 8.
100. Id. at 468, 198 A. at 8.
101. Id., 198 A. at ,8.
102. Id., 198 A. at 8.
103. Id., 198 A. at 8.
104. Id. at 471, 198 A. at 9.
105. Id. at 469, 198 A. at 8.
106. Id. at 471, 198 A. at 9.
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course of the opinion, the court twice cited to the Restatement 0 7 and
called it a "well-settled principle.' 110 8
Notwithstanding the subsequent adoption in Pennsylvania of a
very unrestrictive statute,' 0 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
continued to follow antecedent caselaw by applying the Restatement
position in its examinations of exoneration provisions. This can be
clearly seen in the 1980 case, In re Niessen."0
In Niessen, beneficiaries of a testamentary trust were appealing
an affirmation of the First Account by the Orphan's Court Division
of the Montgomery Court of Common Pleas."' The beneficiaries
charged one of the co-executors, Fidelity Bank, with breach of trust
for merely maintaining custody of various securities in the trust port-
folio, instead of selling them to obtain a higher profit." 2 The trust
instrument contained a clause exonerating the trustees for, "any mis-
take or error of judgment made in good faith.""'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the Orphan's
Court's findings that the trustees had not acted in bad faith and
found that the exoneration clause was effective in protecting the
trustees from liability."' The court held that the exoneration clause
in the will was controlling and provided for a lower standard of care
than would normally be applied to will or trust instruments." 5
4. Analysis of Case Law Under the Texas Statute
Texas courts, which originally applied the Uniform Trusts
Act," and now apply the new Texas exoneration statute," 7 have
been given a greater opportunity to examine the defenses based upon
the liberal exoneration statutes. However, the Texas courts have not
adopted a uniform approach in construing the statute. Some courts
107. Id. at 470-71, 198 A. at 9.
108. Id. at 471, 198 A. at 9.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 7319 (Purdon 1975).
110. 489 Pa. 135, 413 A.2d 1050 (1980).
111. Id. at 137, 413 A.2d at 1051-52.
112. Id. at 138, 413 A.2d at 1052.
113. Id. at 140, 413 A.2d at 1053.
114. Id. at 141, 413 A.2d at 1054.
115. See id. at 139, 413 A.2d at 1052. It is interesting to note that in both of the above
decisions, in spite of the fact that the court applied the more rigorous Restatement position
rather than the more liberal position taken by the Pennsylvania statute, the result was in favor
of the fiduciary.
116. Tex. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-22 (Vernon 1960).
117. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.059 (Vernon 1984).
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in Texas have upheld the non-restrictive use of exoneration clauses " '
while others have followed the approach seen in Pennsylvania,119
moving Texas, by case law, to a position that is more moderate than
the Texas statute suggests.' 20
Burnett v. First National Bank of Waco' is an example of a
case in which a Texas court has strictly adhered to the liberal exon-
eration provisions of section 113.059 and its predecessor. In Burnett,
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Eastland, upheld a directed ver-
dict in favor of exoneration of a trustee bank that loaned trust
money to companies owned by the creator, and also beneficiary, of
the trust. 2 The C&G Trust, the trust at issue, was a revocable trust
created by Clarence Burnett and his wife, Gladys. 23 The First Na-
tional Bank of Waco served as trustee and Clarence and Gladys
were the life beneficiaries of the trust.'24 First National Bank
brought suit against Clarence Burnett, claiming Burnett guaranteed
loans made by the C&G trust, which were in default, and for which
the bank was seeking repayment from Burnett individually. 2 5 Bur-
nett counter-sued arguing that the bank breached its duty as trustee
by "fail[ing] to perform its discretionary functions as trustee because
it did not exercise its own judgment before making the loans."' 26
The loans were made to three companies, all of which were par-
tially owned by Burnett.2 Burnett served as an executive officer for
two of those companies. 2 8 Loans were also made to two of Burnett's
close business associates.' 9 The trust instrument gave the bank trus-
tee complete discretion in the investment and distribution of the
trust funds.' 30 Burnett was always fully informed of the loans and he
118. See infra notes 121-146 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 147-184 and accompanying text.
120. Perhaps the willingness of Texas courts to deviate from the liberal statutory pre-
sumption in favor of upholding exoneration clauses may account for the wealth of litigation
over the effectiveness of exoneration clauses in Texas. This is more clearly seen when com-
pared to the dearth of litigation emanating from jurisdictions in which courts are not willing to
deviate from the liberal exoneration provisions of the Uniform Trusts Act.
121. 567 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
122. Id. at 874.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 875.
126. Id. at 874.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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approved of them in writing.1"'
The Texas Court of Appeals rejected Burnett's argument that
the bank breached its duty.132 It held that Burnett had ratified the
loans made by the bank and, therefore, coupled with the broad dis-
cretion given to the bank originally, the bank should be exonerated
from liability for allowing those loans.133 The court also found that
the bank did not engage in the self-dealing prohibited by section
113.059, so Burnett's ratification was valid under the statute.13'
A line of Texas cases following Burnett demonstrate that some
Texas courts will not deviate from the liberal Texas statute. Even in
a situation where gross negligence existed, such as in the often cited
case Corpus Christi National Bank v. Gerdes,13 5 the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi, enforced a broad clause exonerat-
ing the trustee from liability. Specifically, the court held that the
trustee should be exonerated from liability "for any mistake or error
of judgment or negligence, but [held the trustee] liable only for her
or its own dishonesty."' The trust in question was a testamentary
trust created by Casper Gerdes, Jr."3 7 After Gerdes' death, discord
arose between the Corpus Christi National Bank, as trustee, and the
beneficiaries of the trust: Casper's wife, Clyde Gerdes, and their
daughter, Sally Gerdes. 138 Corpus Christi National Bank petitioned
the court for its removal as trustee, increased compensation, and at-
torney's fees.139 Mr. and Mrs. Gerdes counter-sued, claiming that
Corpus Christi National Bank was negligent and grossly negligent in
its handling of the trust's real property in Texas and Louisiana and
in partitioning the estate's assets." 0 The trial court allowed the bank
to resign, but granted Mrs. Gerdes recovery for the bank's negli-
gence and gross negligence. 14 ' The jury had awarded Mrs. Gerdes
over $9,000 in damages, but the court reduced that award to $750
on remittur." 2 Both parties appealed.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals overruled the trial court on
131. See Burnett, 536 S.W.2d at 603-06.
132. Id. at 606.
133. Id. at 876.
134. Id.
135. 551 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
136. Id. at 523.
137. Id. at 522.
138. Id. at 523.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 523.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 522-23 for a description of the trial outcome.
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the issue of Mrs. Gerdes' recovery. The Appellate Court found that
the exculpatory provision in Mr. Gerdes' will was valid, stating: "It
is clear . . . that the public policy prohibition is limited to exculpa-
tory clauses which authorize self-dealing, which is not in our
case."1" Further, the court held that Mrs. Gerdes was prevented
from recovering for the bank's gross negligence.""
A still more recent case reiterates the Corpus Christi court's
position and also shows the courts' tendency to uphold a liberal exon-
eration clause where the creator of the instrument attempts to exon-
erate persons who are close to him. In 1987, in Blieden v. Green-
span," the Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont, upheld the broad
statutory allowance of exculpation of trustees permitted by section
113.059 where the co-trustees, who were closely related to the set-
tlor, commingled funds and the beneficiaries sought to surcharge the
last surviving trustee for the commingling.146
143. Corpus Christi, 551 S.W.2d at 524.
144. Id.
145. 742 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987), rev'd, 751 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1988). Hyman
Blieden created two testamentary trusts for the benefit of his wife, Doris. Some of Doris and
Hyman's community property was placed in the trusts. Doris and Hyman's brother, William
Blieden, was nominated co-trustee of both trusts. Hyman Blieden's will specifically indicated
that his primary concern was the care of his wife and not the preservation of the trust corpus.
To accomplish this, Blieden's will gave Doris Blieden the right to commingle trust funds with
her own personal property. 742 S.W.2d at 94.
Appellants in this case were the beneficiaries of one of Blieden's trusts, the Blieden, Wolff,
and Tennenbaum Trust, and brought suit for recovery for appellee Greenspan's misadministra-
tion of the trusts. Appellee in this case, Arthur Greenspan, was nominated successor trustee
after the deaths of William and Doris Blieden. Greenspan argued that he never accepted the
trustee position and that the. exoneration clauses in Hyman Blieden's will protected him from
liability. Id. at 96.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Greenspan, finding that
Greenspan had not accepted the trustee position. The court also found that, even if Greenspan
had accepted the position as trustee, he would have been protected by the exoneration clauses
in Blieden's will. The court stated: "It is well settled that the public policy prohibition is lim-
ited to exculpatory provisions which actually authorize self-dealing. There is no self-dealing
shown in the case subjudice." Id. at 97.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that Greenspan may have accepted
the trustee position and that summary judgment was not proper because of this fact in contro-
versy. This opinion did not discuss the alternate holding that Greenspan was exonerated by the
clause in Blieden's will. The court remanded and, on remand in an opinionless decision, the
trial court did not award anything to Blieden's beneficiaries. See Blieden v. Greenspan, No. C-
7201 (June 1, 1988).
146. In an interesting portion of the opinion, the court reviewed the history of § 113.059,
noting that corporate trustees are held to a higher standard than individual trustees. The court
also approvingly noted that the Texas legislature, though repealing most of the old Texas Trust
Act, maintained a liberal statute regarding exoneration clauses, stating: "[T]his codification
makes it clear that the legislature's intention has been, and is, to continue the broad grant of
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In contrast to Burnett,1 4 7 Corpus Christi"8  and Blieden,""
other Texas courts have been willing to consider placing limits on the
scope of section 113.059. The often cited case of Langford v.
Shamburger"1 can be viewed as a clear deviation from other Texas
courts' strict application of section 113.059.
In Langford, decided by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
Fort Worth, P.P. Langford III, as a beneficiary, sued C.D.
Shamburger, individually and as trustee of the P.P. Langford III
Trust. 15  Langford claimed that Shamburger had borrowed money
from the trust fund, commingled trust money with his own and
failed to invest large amounts of trust funds.'5 2 In its original hold-
ing153 and in its rehearing opinion, 5 4 the court was careful to limit
itself to invalidating only exoneration language that permitted self-
dealing. However, the court expanded the restrictive language of sec-
tion 113.059 by holding that the individual trustee, not just the cor-
porate trustee, could also be found liable under the statute for self-
dealing despite the inclusion of an exoneration clause in the trust
instrument or will. 155
What is striking about the opinion is the concern expressed by
the court concerning the need for the court to control the misbehav-
ior of trustees. Three pages of the opinion,' 5  and a good portion of
the rehearing opinion,""1 are devoted to a discussion of the need for
proper court controls over trustees. The court cited the landmark
New York case of Meinhard v. Salmon,15 8 which advocated strong
authority and power given a trustor or settlor to establish a trust and exculpate the trustee as
the trustor or settlor desired." See Blieden, 742 S.W.2d at 96-97.
147. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 145 and accompanying text.
150. 417 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
151. Id. at 440.
152. Id.
153. Langford. 417 S.W.2d at 438.
154. Id. at 446.
155. Id. at 447.
156. Id. at 443-46.
157. Id. at 446-47.
158. 164 N.E. 545 (1928). The famous quotation by Judge Cardozo from Meinhard
used by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals is as follows:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world- for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has
been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undi-
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control over trustees and suggested that control over a trustee might
be appropriate even when the beneficiaries have knowledge of a trus-
tee's breach of duty and fail to complain. 159 A dissenting opinion on
the rehearing'" advocated following prior Texas precedent which en-
dorsed the adherence to the Texas liberal statutory position.
In Interfirst Bank Dallas N.A. v. Risser, 6' the Court of Ap-
peals of Texas, Texarkana, took an even larger step in monitoring
the conduct of trustees under section 113.059. In Interfirst Bank, the
appellees, and original plaintiffs, were beneficiaries of two testamen-
tary trusts created by Dr. Joe Risser, Sr.'"1 Appellant, Interfirst
Bank Dallas, served as trustee for both trusts.18 The beneficiaries
commenced suit against Interfirst Bank claiming that the bank
breached its duty of loyalty through self-dealing.'" The Bank ar-
gued, among other things,' that the exoneration clause in Joe
Risser, Sr.'s will exculpated them from any liability. The clause per-
mitted exoneration of the bank for any act or failure to act absent
proof of bad faith. "
Among the assets of the two trusts were over nine hundred
shares of stock in the Southwest Pump Company. 67 The benefi-
ciaries alleged that Interfirst Bank, acting as trustee, sold the stock
back to Southwest Pump Company below the fair market price."'
Southwest Pump Company, in turn, sold the stock to Sally Estes,
president of the Southwest Pump Company, giving Estes absolute
voting control over Southwest Pump.'"
The trial court found that Interfirst Bank had breached its fidu-
ciary duty by self-dealing, and allowed a jury verdict of over
vided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. . .. Only thus
has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.
(citation ommitted).
Id. at 546.
159. Langford, 417 S.W.2d at 445.
160. Id. at 447.
161. 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App. 1987).
162. Id. at 886.
163. Id. at 887.
164. Id.
165. The bank also argued that their actions did not constitute self-dealing, that the
stock was sold at fair market value, that the jury instructions contained errors, and that the
exemplary damages were too high and should not have been awarded at all. Id. at 888.
166. Interfirst Bank, 739 S.W.2d at 888.
167. Id. at 887.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 887.
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$1,000,000 in actual damages and $10,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages.17 0 The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the trial court's judg-
ment finding that Interfirst was guilty of self-dealing; however, the
court limited the amount of punitive damages to $2,678,750.171
The Court of Civil Appeals defined self-dealing broadly as,
"[a]ny type of activity by the trustee which gives the trustee an ad-
vantage to the detriment of the beneficiaries.... "1 Since Interfirst
had been self-dealing, the court did not allow protection of Interfirst
under the exoneration clause in Risser's will. Of particular interest is
the fact that the court further limited the scope of protection under
the exoneration clause by citing the moderate Restatement standard
as the proper interpretation of section 113.059:
Neither can an exculpatory provision in the trust instrument be ef-
fective to relieve the trustee of liability for action taken in bad faith
or for acting intentionally adverse or with reckless indifference to
the interests of the beneficiary. Restatement (Second) of Trusts
section § (1959). 173
The court's application of the moderate Restatement standard repre-
sents a sharp change in direction from the approach in Burnett,
Corpus Christi and Blieden. 4
Interfirst Bank Dallas v. Risser has been approvingly cited in
more recent Texas cases. In Grider v. Boston Co., Inc.,175 a group of
limited partners brought suit against the general partners of The
Boston Company, Inc., claiming that the general partners had
charged them excessive administration fees. 76 Each limited partner-
ship agreement gave the general partners broad discretion in their
management.1 77 The agreements also included clauses exonerating
the company for liability, "except for willful [sic] malfeasance or
fraud."178 The court cited Risser, stating:
When the parties bargain on equal terms, a fiduciary may contract
for the limitation of his liability. Cf. Risser, 739 S.W.2nd at 888.
However, public policy precludes the limitation of liability for (1)
170. See id. at 909-10.
171. Id. at 909.
172. Id. at 898.
173. Id. at 888.
174. See supra notes 122, 136, 146 and accompanying text.
175. 773 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
176. Id. at 339.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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self-dealing, (2) bad faith, (3) intentional adverse acts, and (4)
reckless indifference with respect to the beneficiary and his best
interest. Id. at 897-98. See also Tex. Prop. Code Ann.
§ 113.059. 9
Although the Texas Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs
had failed to plead any of the public policy prohibitions cited in
Risser and the Restatement, (therefore, the exoneration clause pro-
tected the general partners), the priority of the Risser approach was
implicitly accepted.
Texas courts have not moved uniformly towards a moderate po-
sition regarding the policing of exoneration clauses; however, a fair
reading of the Texas case law aligns Texas courts with the general
approach courts are taking to the enforcement of exoneration clauses
across the country. 180 For the most part, Texas courts will act deci-
sively to prevent wrongdoing resulting from bad faith and/or over-
reaching. Though apparently inconsistent in their approach to the
Texas statute, both Blieden'8 ' and Interfirst Bank" 2 can be largely
reconciled with each other and the general national trend by looking
beyond the courts' reasoning to the underlying facts presented in the
cases. In Blieden, where bad faith or abuse of the fiduciary relation-
ship was not shown, the court, without question, permitted the exon-
eration clause to protect the trustee. 8 3 In Risser, bad faith and se-
vere self-dealing was shown so that, in spite of the literal statutory
language, the court did not permit the exoneration clause to be
effective.' 84
The consistent pattern apparent in Texas cases is that Texas
courts will control trustees when they see an egregious wrong; how-
ever, they will allow an exoneration clause to take effect when the
claimed wrong does not appear to be egregious and the creator of the
instrument intentionally protected the fiduciary by including an ex-
oneration clause.
179. Id. at 343.
180. See, e.g., infra pp. 149-154.
181. 742 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 751 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1988). For a
discussion of the case, see supra note 145.
182. 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes
161-173 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 146.
184. See supra pp. 143-44.
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V. STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED MODERATE POSITIONS BY
STATUTE OR CASE LAW
A. Moderate Statutes
1. States That Have Adopted Restatement-Type Statutes
Section 222 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 85 adopted
in 1959, reflects a common moderate approach, both for states which
have adopted statutes and for states relying solely on case law. Sec-
tion 222 reads:
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the trustee, by
provisions in the terms of the trust, can be relieved of liability for
breach of trust.
(2) A provision in the trust instrument is not effective to relieve the
trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or
intentionally or with reckless indifference to the interest of the ben-
eficiary, or of liability for any profit which the trustee has derived
from a breach of trust.
(3) To the extent to which a provision relieving the trustee of lia-
bility for breaches of trust is inserted in the trust instrument as the
result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship to the settlor, such provision is ineffective. 86
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959). Section 222 was not revised in
the Second Restatement and has remained the same since the first Restatement of Trusts. See
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 222 (1935).
186. The official comment to subsection (1) of section 222 provides that all exculpatory
provisions are to be strictly construed and that the trustee will be exonerated only if its acts
fall within the explicit language of the provision. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
222 comment (a) (1959).
The official comment to subsection (2) distinguishes classic exoneration clauses, in which
the standard of fiduciary care is to be lowered, from indirect methods of exoneration resulting
from clauses limiting a trustee's obligations by broadening or limiting its duties. The comment
provides:
If by the terms of the trust it is provided that the trustee shall not be under any
duty to do or to refrain from doing an act ... the trustee does not commit a breach
of trust in doing or failing to do the act, unless such a provision is ineffective as
contrary to public policy.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 comment (c) (1959).
The official comment to subsection (3) indicates that the following factors are considered
in deciding whether there has been an "abuse of a fiduciary relationship": (a) is there a less-
than-arm's, length relationship between the settlor and the fiduciary?; (b) was the instrument
drafted by the fiduciary or someone allied with the fiduciary?; (c) was the settlor experienced
or inexperienced with business affairs, and, further, does the settlor have an understanding of
the exculpatory provision?; (d) was the provision inserted due to a trustee's undue influence or
other improper conduct?; and, (e) how reasonable is the provision itself? See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 comment (d) (1959).
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Five states currently have statutes based upon the Restatement:
California, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, and Montana. All of the
statutes have been fairly recently enacted. Louisiana's statute, 87 the
oldest, was enacted in 1964; section 30-4-3-31188 of the Indiana Code
was enacted in 1984; section 16461189 of the California Probate
Code was enacted in 1986; section 72-34-512190 of the Montana
Trust Code was enacted in 1989; and, section 53-12-194191 of the
Georgia Code was enacted in 1991. In each of the five states that
have enacted statutes based on the Restatement, the changes to sec-
tion 222 have been only slight. 192
2. Statutorily Moderate Positions Other Than the
Restatement
Two states, Connecticut193 and Washington,""' have moved by
statute towards moderate positions without adopting section 222 of
the Restatement. Although these moderate statutes are drafted inde-
pendently from the Restatement model, the flexible language em-
ployed and the standards for public policy limitations used resemble
the standards set in the Restatement.
187. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2206 (West 1991).
188. IND. CODE § 30-4-3-31 (1991).
189. CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 16461 (West 1991). In 1986, the California legislature
first enacted section 16461. During the 1990 legislative session, California repealed its 1986
Probate Code but preserved section. 16461 without change.
190. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-512 (1989). Official comments to section 72-34-512
indicate that the Montana legislature used California's statute as a model but removed "bad
faith" from subsection 2(a) because it felt that such language was too subjective.
191. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-194 (1991). Prior to the enactment of section 53-12-194,
the Supreme Court of Georgia cited section 222 of the Restatement. See Perling v. Citizens
and Southern Nat. Bank, 300 S.E.2d 649 (Ga. 1983). However, the Court in Perling only
approves of comment (a) of the Restatement section 222 which indicates that exoneration
clauses are to be strictly construed. The court then exonerates Citizens and Southern National
Bank from liability for failure to diversify the trust corpus and for retaining stock that was
becoming less valuable over a period of years. Official comments to section 53-12-194 cite to
Perling. Perhaps the Georgia legislature enacted section 53-12-194 to prevent the broad,
hands-off judicial policy towards trustees that the Georgia Supreme Court took in Perling. The
official comments do not clarify why Perling was cited.
192. The general public policy prohibitions of subsection two were embodied in all five
state enactments, but in several states some of the specific terms were omitted and some new
terms were added. For example, the California legislature added "gross negligence" to its list
of public policy restrictions adopted from section 222. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 16461
(West 1991) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 222 (1959).
Three states, California, Montana, and Georgia, have entirely omitted subsection (3) from
their statutes.
193. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-234 (38) (1990).
194. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010 (1987).
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The history of the development of a statutory scheme for regu-
lating the use of exoneration clauses in Washington demonstrates the
move, both by case law and statute, towards a moderate position.
Washington originally had a liberal statute 95 containing language
that appears to be taken from section 17 of the Uniform Trusts
Act, 19' where no public policy restrictions were placed on exonera-
tion clauses - not even a restriction on self-dealing. In 1984, the
Washington legislature recodified and amended section 30.99.020 by
adding a final sentence onto the statute. The statute, renumbered
section 11.97.010, now includes: "In no event may a trustee be re-
lieved of the duty to act in good faith and with honest judgment."' 97
This language marks a definitive change towards a moderate ap-
proach for Washington, bringing Washington's statute in line with
the growing number of moderate jurisdictions.
Connecticut is unusual in that its statute was not drafted as a
statute; rather, Connecticut's moderate approach was incorporated
into a subsection of a much broader statute, The Fiduciary Powers
Act. 98 Subsection 38 of the Connecticut Fiduciary Powers Act
reads:
The fiduciary is hereby exonerated from any liability resulting
from its retention, sale or operation, whether due to losses, depreci-
ation in value or actions taken or omitted to be taken with respect
to any business, farm or real estate interests held in an estate or
trust, nor shall the fiduciary be liable for any loss to or depreciation
of any other estate or trust property, so long as it is acting in good
faith in the management thereof and exercising reasonable care
and diligence, but the fiduciary is not exonerated from his own bad
faith, willful misconduct or gross negligence. 199
It should be noted that the Connecticut Legislature's choice of
placement for their exoneration statute appears exceptional and in-
appropriate. A look at the index to the Connecticut General Statutes
reveals that the exoneration subsection is difficult, if not impossible,
to find; the index contains no reference to exoneration or related
195. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.99.020 (1959). For a description of the text, see the
historical note to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.97.010 (West 1987).
196. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
197. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.97.010 (West 1987)
198. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-234 (1990).
199. Id. at § 45a-234 (38). The Fiduciary Powers Act was first enacted in 1969 and was
amended in 1971. The original draft appears to be limited to exoneration for mismanagement
of a business, farm or real estate; however, the 1971 amendment broadened the subsection by
allowing exoneration for any property held in an estate or trust. Id. (historical notes).
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subjects.
B. An Analysis of Case Law Under Moderate Statutes
As suggested above with regard to the law in Texas and Penn-
sylvania,2"' exoneration case law throughout moderate jurisdictions
can be largely reconciled by an analysis which suggests that honest,
if slightly negligent, fiduciaries will be exonerated by courts where
instruments contain sufficiently broad exoneration clauses; further,
fiduciaries who act with a greater degree of culpability than ordinary
negligence will not be protected by the courts from liability regard-
less of the existence of an exoneration clause in the governing instru-
ment. The Texas and Pennsylvania courts, in spite of the existence of
seemingly conflicting statutory authority, developed this standard by
court decision. As will be seen immediately below, courts in the
moderate statutory jurisdictions, aided by the existence of consistent
statutory authority, are able to arrive at reasonable results based on
the actual fact pattern without the need to struggle with an inflexible
overriding statute.
In Maginnis v. Maginnis,0 1 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana
permitted an exoneration clause to protect a fiduciary from liability
for a mistake in accounting that was not caused by the fiduciary. 202
In Maginnis, the beneficiary of a testamentary trust, Gordon Magin-
nis, brought suit against his brother, John Maginnis, seeking removal
of his brother as trustee and repayment of interest on sums that John
Maginnis allegedly withheld from the trust corpus.2 03
The Maginnis' mother, Ruth Maginnis, had created three testa-
mentary trusts, including the trust for Gordon Maginnis.20' The
trust instrument contained an exoneration clause relieving the trust-
ees of all liabilities resulting from breach of trust. 05 An accounting
made in preparation for the initial distribution of the estate into the
trusts revealed that a little over $16,700 of Gordon Maginnis' trust
money was given to John Maginnis by mistake.20 6 The accounting
was prepared by an attorney and CPA mutually chosen.by Gordon
and John Maginnis2 0° The Court of Appeal of Louisiana found that
200. See supra pp. 136-145.
201. 449 So. 2d 573 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
202. Id. at 575.
203. Id. at 574.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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the error did not occur "through any fraud, bad faith, or breach of
the duty of loyalty on the part of John .... -208 In analyzing the
effect of the exoneration clause, the court stated:
The trust instrument relieved the trustees ...of all liability for
breach of trust except breach of the duty of loyalty. The Trust
Code permits the trust instrument to exculpate a trustee from all
liability for breach of trust except in breach of trust committed in
bad faith, or one committed in breach of the duty of loyalty ...
Thus, the exculpatory provision of the trust instrument is fully
enforceable.20
Since the court found that John Maginnis had neither breached his
duty of loyalty, nor acted in bad faith, nor was willfully fraudulent,
the court found the exoneration clause fully effective in protecting
him.21 0
In contrast, in In re Donald Bradford Trust, neither the Louisi-
ana Court of Appeal211 nor the Louisiana Supreme Court 12 allowed
an exoneration clause to fully protect a trustee whose actions were
characterized by the courts as willful and grossly negligent.
The trust in question was created by Donald Bradford for the
benefit of his three children, Mark Allen, Leigh Ann, and Amy
Crowell.21 a Donald Bradford, an attorney at the time of the creation
of the trust, nominated one of the attorneys in his law firm, Ben R.
Downing, Jr., as trustee .21  Downing later filed a petition to resign
and, by ex parte order, was allowed to resign without rendering a
final accounting of the trust. 15 Downing was succeeded by E. Briggs
Wharton, a friend of the family.2 16
The trust instrument contained a clause exonerating the trustee
from liability for every act, even those of others, except for the trus-
tee's own willful fault or gross negligence.2 17
Donald Bradford had been receiving distributions from the trust
208. Id. at 575.
209. Id. at 574-75.
210. Id. at 575.
211. 524 So. 2d 1213 (La. Ct. App. 1987), writ granted, 526 So. 2d 785 (La. 1988).
212. 538 So. 2d 263 (La. 1989).
213. Bradford Trust, 538 So. 2d at 264. At first, the trust corpus contained slightly over
forty shares of stock in a local corporation. The trust was later supplemented by Bradford's
father-in-law, who donated $54,000 to the trust. 524 So. 2d at 1214.
214. 538 So. 2d at 264.
215. 524 So. 2d at 1214-15.
216. Id.
217. 524 So. 2d at 1214.
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fund during both Downing and Wharton's trusteeships2 1 8 For exam-
ple, over $15,000 had been given to Bradford in the form of divi-
dends from a partnership interest which he had previously sold to the
trust.21 9 Further, over $16,000 had been distributed to Bradford
from the trust for purposes such as making an unsecured personal
loan to Bradford's brother and for family vacations.2 0 Moreover, in
what was perhaps the most flagrant act of abuse, Wharton, as sole
trustee, sold from the trust corpus thousands of shares of stock in the
Lehman Company.22' Bradford personally borrowed the revenue
from the sale and in return, gave the trust an unsecured non-interest
bearing promissory note for the loan. 2 2 Although Bradford repaid
the promissory note, he did not pay any interest on the money until
after the commencement of the lawsuit, and then repaid only seven
percent interest.2
Mark Allen and Mrs. Anne Crowell Wilson, tutrix2 4 of her mi-
nor daughter, Amy Crowell, brought suit against Wharton, charging
him with breach of trust for disbursing money to Bradford and for
failing to demand a final accounting from Downing which would
have revealed Downing's disbursements to Bradford.2 5 The plaintiffs
also requested that Wharton be forced to resign and surcharged for
revenues and profits due to his breach of trust.22
Wharton responded that he was not liable for the acts of Down-
ing because the court had issued an ex parte order which allowed
Downing to resign without rendering an accounting of the trust.227
He also argued that even if the -court found that the order was inva-
lid and a breach of trust was committed, such breach did not result
from any willful fault or gross negligence on his part; therefore, the
exoneration clause in the trust protected him from liability. 28
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana found Wharton liable for his
breach of duty and for Downing's breach of duty.2 9 Specifically, the
court found that Wharton committed both a willful breach of trust
218. Id. at 1216.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1216-17.
221. Id. at 1217.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. A tutor/tutrix is the closest civil law equivalent to a common-law guardian.
225. 524 So. 2d at 1214-15.
226, Id. at 1214.
227. Id. at 1214-15.
228. Id. at 1218.
229. Id. at 1218-19.
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and a breach of the duty of loyalty by joining with Downing to ob-
tain Downing's resignation without an accounting and allowing
Bradford to use the trust funds."' Due to the culpability of Whar-
ton's actions, the court found that the exoneration clause in the trust
instrument was ineffective in protecting him.2 3
The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the appellate court's
judgment against Wharton for the breach of trust committed during
his trusteeship.23 2 However, the court reversed the appellate court's
judgment against Wharton for Downing's breach of trust, stating:
When the foregoing provisions of the [Louisiana Trust Code' 8 ]
and the trust instrument are considered together, it is apparent that
Wharton could only be liable for losses resulting from his (1) gross
negligence; (2) willful fault (bad faith) or (3) breach of duty of
loyalty to a fiduciary . . . Given the existence of a judicial order
relieving Downing of the duty to file a final account, Wharton's
failure to disregard the order and demand an accounting did not
constitute gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a breach of any
duty to the fiduciaries .28
As the case illustrates, the language of section 9:2206 and the
language of section 222 of the Restatement are flexible. A moderate
statute gives the court wide latitude in deciding a matter since the
court, as finder of fact, can exercise its discretion in characterizing
the questionable conduct. For example, in Bradford, the Louisana
Court of Appeal found Wharton's failure both grossly negligent and
willful, whereas the supreme court characterized Wharton's failure
to demand an accounting as less than grossly negligent or willful.
The flexibility of section 9:2206 allowed both Louisiana courts to
make conflicting judgments regarding the culpability of the trustee
while still remaining within the prevailing statutory provision.
Similarly, the Connecticut statute2 5 has been effective in al-
lowing the Connecticut courts to concentrate on the culpability of
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1218. The court held that "[tihe duty of loyalty is the fundamental duty
owed by a trustee as a fiduciary. Because of that fact, [the] exculpatory provision in the trust
instrument [was] not effective to relieve the trustee from liability. Id.
232. 538 So. 2d 263, 267-68.
233. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2206(b) (West 1991). The pertinent section of this
statute provides that an exoneration clause "is not effective to relieve the trustee from liability
for breach of the duty of loyalty to a beneficiary of for breach of trust committed in bad
faith." Id.
234. Bradford Trust, 538 So. 2d at 267.
235. CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 45A, § 234(38) (1990).
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the fiduciary based on the actual facts. In Jackson v. Conland,2"6 the
Connecticut Supreme Court upheld an exoneration clause where the
trustees of an inter vivos trust were found neither to have committed
any willful misconduct, nor to have acted with reckless disregard for
the interests of the beneficiaries."3 7 The trust was created by John
Day Jackson, owner of the New Haven Register newspapers.2" s The
trust corpus, in part, contained all but two shares of the Register
Corporation s.23  The trustees at the time of the event at issue were
two family members, Lionel S. Jackson, son of John Day, and Lionel
S. Jackson, Jr., grandson of John Day.240 A third trustee, not a fam-
ily member, was Henry J. Conland. 41
The plaintiff beneficiaries brought suit charging the trustees
with breach of trust for willful failure to observe the prudent inves-
tor standard and for reckless disregard to the interests of the benefi-
ciaries.242 After studying the investment and obtaining a vote of ap-
proval from the board of directors of the Register Corporation, the
trustees purchased the Hartford Times newspaper.24 The Times had
been losing money, but the trustees had speculated that the Times
could again be a profitable newspaper if it combined forces with the
Register.244 The Times failed to improve and the trustees made ad-
vances to the Times in order to try to sell it to recoup some losses. 24 5
First. the trustees argued that the trust instrument did not re-
quire them, as trustees, to observe the prudent investment stan-
dard.246 The trust instrument provided that "in exercising their dis-
cretion with respect to this matter, they shall not be held to the
standard of a prudent investor ... .
Second, the trustees argued that even if they were required to
observe the prudent investor standard, and therefore breached their
duty as trustees by purchasing the Times, the breach was not willful
or reckless, and thus the exoneration clause in the trust instrument
236. 178 Conn. 52, 420 A.2d 898 (1979).
237. Id. at 52, 420 A.2d at 898.
238. Id. at 53, 420 A.2d at 899.
239. Id., 420 A.2d at 899.
240. Id. at 54, 420 A.2d at 900.
241. Id., 420 A.2d at 900.
242. Id., 420 A.2d at 900.
243. Id. at 59, 420 A.2d at 902.
244. Id., 420 A.2d at 902.
245. Id. at 60, 420 A.2d at 902.
246. Id. at 54, 420 A.2d at 900.
247. Id. at 56, 420 A.2d at 901. "This matter" refers to the retaining or selling of trust
assets and general administration of the trust. Id., 420 A.2d at 901.
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protected them from liability for the Times purchase. 48 The exoner-
ation clause provided that "no trustee shall be held liable to any ben-
eficiary ... for any act or omission to act as such trustee ... unless
such act or omission to act constituted willful misconduct on his
part."92 49
The trial court agreed with the trustees, finding that the trustees
were not required to strictly observe the prudent investor standard
by the trust instrument and therefore had not breached their fiduci-
ary duty by purchasing the Times.250 The trial court also found that
the trustees had not acted with reckless disregard for the benefi-
ciaries and that there had been no willful misconduct on the part of
the trustees.2 51 The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld both findings
of the trial court.252
C. Moderate Case Law in the Absence of a Statute
1. Analysis of Case Law in Restatement Jurisdictions
In addition to providing a basis for a growing number of moder-
ate state statutes regulating exoneration clauses, Restatement section
222 is also the standard cited by many state courts in states that do
not have a statute regulating the use of exoneration clauses. Approx-
imately thirty-four states do not have statutes regulating exoneration
clauses. Of the approximately twenty-four states whose courts have
ruled on the effectiveness of exoneration clauses without statutory
guidance, some thirteen of the states in this group have cited the
Restatement section 222 as the proper standard.2 53 Even in the ab-
sence of any guiding. statute, the basic analysis, mentioned above,254
applies. In these Restatement common law jurisdictions, fiduciaries
248. Id. at 57, 420 A.2d at 901.
249. Id., 420 A.2d at 901.
250. Id. at 54, 420 A.2d at 900.
251. Id. at 57, 420 A.2d at 901.
252. Id. at 60, 420 A.2d at 902.
253. These jurisdictions include: Delaware, see Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 1977 WL
5316 (Del. Ch. 1977); the District of Columbia, see Godette v. Cox, 592 A.2d 1028, 1033
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Illinois, see Axelrod v. Giambalvo, 129 Ill. App. 512, 517, 472 N.E.2d 840,
844 (1984); Iowa, see Hanson v. Minette, 46 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Iowa 1990); Maryland, see
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 350, 587 A.2d 511, 518 (1991); Mas-
sachusetts, see Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Boone, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 489 N.E.2d
209 (1986); Missouri, see Jarvis v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 478 S.W.2d 266, 274 (Mo. 1972);
New Jersey, see Farr v. First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 4 N.J. Super. 89, 94, 66 A.2d
444, 446 (App. Div. 1949); Tennessee, see Petty v. Privette, 818 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tenn. App.
1989).
254. See supra notes 200-252 and accompanying text.
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whom the courts felt were merely negligent or had made an error in
judgment were consistently allowed to be exonerated by provisions in
the trust instrument or will, whereas fiduciaries who had acted in
bad faith, or willfully breached their fiduciary duty, or acted with
reckless indifference to the interests of the beneficiaries were not
found to be protected by exoneration clauses, no matter how broad
or clearly written the clause.
For example, in Sullivan v. Mosner2 5 5 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland upheld an exoneration clause which protected the trustee
in its disbursement of an inter vivos trust fund without proper au-
thorization from the settlor/beneficiary. 2" The trust was created to
facilitate the purchase and construction of a partially built home
bought by the Sullivans 57 William F. Mosner and C. Arthur Eby
were the nominated trustees of this trust . 58
. Mr. Sullivan had hired Frank Vavra, a contractor who had done
previous work on the house, to finish the construction on the house,
in spite of the recommendation by Mosner that he not do so.2 59 After
the commencement of the construction project, Vavra requested pay-
ment, but Mosner pointed out to him that under the terms of the
contract Vavra was not to be paid until the job was finished. 6 0
Vavra threatened to walk off the job if he was not paid immedi-
ately." ' Vavra eventually succeeded in getting trust funds from
Mosner. 211 At trial, there was some question as to whether Sullivan
was notified, but the trial court found that Vavra had called Sullivan
who. in turn called Mosner and authorized the disbursements.26 3
Later in the project, Vavra did not complete his work in the planned
amount of time and was fired. 64
The Sullivan's brought suit seeking just over $12,000 in dam-
ages and Mosner's removal as trustee . 65 They charged Mosner with
reckless indifference to their interests as beneficiaries, failure to exer-
cise the ordinary skill required of trustees and mismanagement of
255. 295 A.2d 482 (Md. 1972).
256. Id. at 493.
257. Id. at 484.
258. Id. at 484.
259. Id. at 483.
260. Id: at 485.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 486.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 484.
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the trust funds which, the Sullivans alleged, Mosner wrongfully dis-
bursed to Vavra.266 Mosner argued that he was not negligent in dis-
bursing trust funds under Mr. Sullivan's direction, and that even if
he had made an error in judgment, the exculpatory provision in the
trust instrument protected him from liability. 2 67
The trial court did not reach the issue of the exculpatory clause
but found that Mosner had not been negligent and that Sullivan's
approval of the disbursements of funds allowed Mosner to make the
disbursements without fault. "66 The court of appeals reversed in part,
holding that Mr. Sullivan was not expressly an agent for Mrs. Sulli-
van and therefore Mosner had not gotten her express approval and
had put her interests at risk.269 However, the Court of Appeals found
that Mosner had not acted recklessly in assuming that Mr. Sullivan,
in approving the disbursements, was speaking both for himself and
his wife.1 70 The Sullivans had argued that the exculpatory provision
was completely void as against public policy.27 1
The Court of Appeals instead took the Restatement approach to
policing exoneration clauses.2 17 The court found that Mosner had not
profited from the disbursements and had not inserted the clause
through an abuse of his relationship with the Sullivans; thus subsec-
tion (3) and part of subsection (2) did not apply."' The court also
found that Mosner had not acted in bad faith, or with reckless indif-
ference to the Sullivans, nor did he willfully breach his fiduciary
duty in relying on Mr. Sullivan's approval and disbursing the funds,
therefore the exoneration clause was effective in protecting him from
liability.2 74
2. Analysis of Case Law in Jurisdictions Not Citing the
Restatement
In some jurisdictions lacking a controlling statute, section 222
of the Restatement is not cited as the proper standard. These juris-
dictions, with neither a controlling statute nor a Restatement-based
common law approach, have adopted a moderate standard for polic-
266. Id. at 486.
267. See id. at 493.
268. See id. at 490.
269. Id. at 490.
270. Id. at 493.
271. Id. at 490.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 491; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 22 (1959).
274. Sullivan, at 491.
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ing exoneration clauses that is very similar to the Restatement.175
For example, in Michigan, where courts do not cite the Restate-
ment, despite the existence of an exoneration clause, the court will
surcharge a trustee found to be guilty of bad faith. In In re Green
Charitable Trust, 76 the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed a
probate court's surcharge of the trustees of the Green Trusts and
their removal from trusteeship for their breach of a duty of loyalty,
bad faith, and reckless disregard for the interests of the
beneficiaries. 27
In September of 1984, Miles Jaffee and Comerica Bank filed
their first account for the Green Trusts in the Probate Court, Oak-
land County. 7 8 St. Peter's Home for Boys and the Michigan Attor-
ney General, as representative for some of the charitable organiza-
tions which were nominated as beneficiaries of the Green Trust,
objected to the first account, charging Jaffe and Comerica with
breach of the duty of loyalty, bad faith, and reckless disregard for
the beneficiaries .1 9 The Green Trusts, a small number of testamen-
tary trusts created by Mr. Green and his wife, contained over
$1,000,000. in cash and securities and an interest in the Green real
property called Turtle Lake Farms.2 80
Soon after Mrs. Green's death, Comerica and Jaffe determined
that they would need to sell Turtle Lake Farms in order to satisfy
some of the bequests, estate taxes, administrative costs, and the
funding of a $1,000,000 trust fund for the Green's granddaughter. 81
Turtle Lake Farms spread across 315 acres and consisted of a 211
acre homestead, the Green mansion, one lake, and additional
lakefront property. 82 In 1983, twenty days after Turtle Lake Farms
was put on the market, Comerica' accepted an offer from Maurice
275. New Hampshire is one such jurisdiction. In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.
Faulkner, 143 A.2d 403 (N.H. 1958), the court followed a moderate standard stating that
"exculpatory agreements . . . which relieve a trustee from liability for negligence are valid
and enforceable; but such provisions which purport to relieve from bad faith or intentional
wrongs are considered to be against public policy and will not be enforced." Id. at 408.
Michigan is another jurisdiction which follows a moderate standard similar to the Re-
statement. See infra notes 276-295 and accompanying text.
276. 431 N.W.2d 492 (Mich. App. 1988).
277. Id. at 504.
278. Id. at 496.
279. Id. at 496-97.
280. Id. at 494.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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Cohen for $3,250,000 with a $1,500,000 down payment.2 8 At trial it
was shown that the trustees had not gotten a proper appraisal of the
property prior to its sale.284 Further, the trustees did not widely ad-
vertise Turtle Farms Lake, but circulated some brochures which did
not indicate that there should be a quick response.28 5 Evidence
showed that one prospective purchaser was told that he would need
an initial outlay of $4,000,000, and another was originally told that
it would be nine months before bids for the property would be ac-
cepted. 86 Moreover, Jaffee was a member of the law firm that repre-
sented the buyer, Maurice Cohen. 87 Although the Probate Court
did not find that Jaffee had been actively involved with the Cohen
side of the purchase, it was proven that he attended some meetings
where the purchase had been discussed and he approved of the
purchase at those meetings. 88
Comerica and Jaffe argued that they were not negligent in their
sale of Turtle Lake Farms and that the exoneration clause in the
trust instrument protected them even if they had been negligent. 89
The trust instrument gave Jaffee and Comerica broad discretion "to
do everything they in good faith deem advisable even though it
would not be authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries (but for this
power) under any statutory or other rule of law. .. ."290
The Probate Court removed Comerica and Jaffe as trustees and
surcharged them $1,900,000, finding Comerica and Jaffe had negli-
gently sold Turtle Lake Farms without trying to obtain a higher
purchase price. 91 Moreover, the Probate Court found that Jaffe had
breached his duty of loyalty by aiding his client, Cohen, to obtain
the property at an inadequate price, and held Comerica negligent in
its response to Jaffe's known conflict of interest. 92
On appeal, Jaffe and Comerica argued that the Probate Court
was in error for not giving effect to the exoneration clause.293 The
Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed, stating:
283. Id. at 495.
284. Id. at 500.
285. Id. at 501.
286. Id. at 498.
287. Id. at 503.
288. Id. at 504.
289. See id. at 498.
290. Id. at 498.
291. Id. at 497.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 499.
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The exculpatory clause does not preclude judicial review or appli-
cation of the required standard of care. . . . [T]ransactions involv-
ing self-dealing should be closely scrutinized and looked to see
whether the trustee's actions indicated any fraud, bad faith or over-
reaching on the part of the trustee.""
The court of appeals found that Comerica and Jaffe had acted in
bad faith and prevented the exoneration clause in the trust instru-
ment from taking effect.2 98 Thus, it is clear that although the court
of appeals did not cite the Restatement section 222, the court's con-
ception of the public policy limitations on exoneration clauses ap-
pears to be essentially the same as the Restatement's.
VI. CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES HELD TO A HIGHER STANDARD OF
CONDUCT
Commentators such as Scott296 and others 297 have consistently
argued for public policy limits holding corporate fiduciaries to a
higher standard of conduct even in the presence of an exoneration
clause. States have not, to date, formulated a consistent approach to
the question of whether a higher standard should be applied to cor-
porate fiduciary conduct. Instead, state courts appear to have ana-
lyzed the culpability of each fiduciary on a case-by-case basis. Often,
where corporate fiduciaries have acted with a greater amount of cul-
pability, courts appear to have required a higher standard of conduct
from those fiduciaries, although rarely do they explicitly indicate
that they are doing so. In contrast, courts have explicitly indicated
that they hold an individual fiduciary to a lower standard of conduct,
especially if family members are concerned. 98 Often, the expressed
rationale of the court is the intent of the settlor bolstered by the
inherent trust in the family relationship. Rarely will courts identify
the presence of an individual fiduciary versus a corporate fiduciary
as the most important factor in their decision. 99
Good examples of courts giving more leeway to individual fidu-
ciaries can be found in the New York cases giving effect to exonera-
294. Id. at 499.
295. Id. at 504.
296. See ScoTr, supra note 4, § 222.4.
297. For a particularly notable early article advocating the requirement of a higher
standard of conduct by corporate fiduciaries, see Shinn, Exoheration Clauses in Trust Instru-
ments, 42 YALE L.J. 359 (1933).
298. See discussion supra pp. 149-154.
299. For a good example, see Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 1977 WL 5316 (Del. Ch.
1977) (mentioning that corporate fiduciaries are held to a higher standard than an individual).
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tion clauses in inter vivos trusts800 and in the cases from the Uniform
Trusts Act states801 discussed above. In O'Hayer v. De St. Aubin,302
the New York court even allowed extensive self-dealing in which the
trustee, son of the settlor, gained control over a family company by
personally purchasing stock out of the trust fund. 803 The rationale of
the court was that De St. Aubin, Sr. intended his son to be able to
do that.30" In Bank of Nevada v. Speirs,3°0 the Nevada court allowed
an ex-husband to personally purchase stock in a piece of property
held in trust, of which he was trustee, for his daughter.306 The court
placed emphasis on the family relationship and the personal care and
concern involved.307
In contrast to the family fiduciary cases, examples can be found
of courts rigorously policing the activities of corporate fiduciaries. In
Interfirst Bank Dallas N.A. v. Risser,308 the Court of Appeals of
Texas not only found Interfirst Bank, trustee for the Risser trust,
had engaged with in self-dealing and was liable under the applicable
Texas statute, 0 9 but the court applied the Restatement standard,
much less forgiving of fiduciary misconduct than the Texas liberal
statute.310 In addition, the punitive damages awarded were very
high: $10,000,000 at the trial level, which the Court of Appeals re-
duced to over $2,500,000 on appeal.311
Two states, Texas and Oklahoma, as mentioned above, 312 have
passed statutes that provide for blanket liability for corporate fiduci-
aries in the event of self-dealing in spite of an exoneration clause,
but allow an exoneration clause to be effective where there is self-
dealing by an individual fiduciary. These statutes represent a first
step towards an articulated higher standard of conduct for corporate
fiduciaries.
300. See O'Hayer v. De St. Aubin, 30 A.D.2d 419 (App. Div. 1968); see also In re
Cowles Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1965); supra pp. 129-131.
301. See Bank of Nevada v. Speirs, 95 Nev. 870, 603 P.2d 1074 (1979); see also, New-
man v. Morris, 574 P.2d 615 (Okla. 1977); supra pp. 131-34.
302. 30 A.D.2d 419, 293 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1968).
303. Id. at 424, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
304. Id. at 423, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
305. 603 P.2d 1074 (Nev. 1979).
306. Id. at 1076.
307. Id.
308. 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987).
309. Id. at 898.
310. Id. at 897.
311. Id. at 909.
312. See supra, note 64.
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Thus far, Texas courts have construed their blanket-type statute
regarding the corporate fiduciary with mixed results. Blieden v.
Greenspan3 13 is an example of a strict reading of section 113.059,
maintaining the distinction between corporate and individual fiducia-
ries. The Blieden court cited the Texas statute, section 133.059, and
emphasized the language in the statute holding corporate fiduciaries
to a higher standard, stating: "Of course, it is clear that no corporate
trustee was named by the trustor."3' " The court also looked to the
intent of Blieden as a good reason for giving individual fiduciaries
room to self-deal, while refusing such room to corporate fiduciaries:
"After all, the trustor-settlor had appointed his own brother, Wil-
liam, as well as his wife, Doris, to be trustees and he obviously
wanted to give them the fullest protection that the law allowed. '3 15
Where the fiduciary's conduct was culpable enough, however,
another Texas court did not find the distinction between corporate
and individual fiduciaries to be controlling. In Langford v.
Shamburger,"1 the court held that Shamburger had committed all
of the claimed breaches of trust and he should be deemed liable de-
spite the exoneration clause, Shamburger's family relationship with
Langford, and the Texas statute not regulating self-dealing by indi-
vidual fiduciaries.311 Apparently, the culpability of Shamburger was
simply too great.
The benefit of a statute like Texas' is that it encourages courts
to apply a higher standard against the conduct of a corporate fiduci-
ary. The problem that may occur from the blanket statutory restric-
tion on self-dealing is that a court may lose the flexibility of equita-
bly deciding the case based upon the special set of facts presented.
For example, corporate fiduciaries who include exoneration clauses
in instruments without the knowledge of the creator would not be
prohibited from doing so by a statute which provided a higher stan-
313. 742 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987), rev'd. 751 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1988). The
settlor of the trusts had named his brother, his wife, and Greenspan as co-trustees. The trial
court found that Greenspan had not accepted a position as individual trustee for the trust
created by Blieden, but if Greenspan had accepted the trustee position, he would have been
protected from a claim of self-dealing by the exoneration clause. 742 S.W.2d at 94; see supra
notes 145-46 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the case.
314. Id. at 96.
315. Id. at 97.
316. 417 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). P.P. Langford sued C.D. Shamburger as
trustee of the Langford trust for failure to invest the trust corpus, for borrowing money from
the trust fund, and for commingling the trust fund with Shamburger's own assets. Shamburger
was Langford's uncle. For a complete description of the case, see supra pp. 142-43.
317. See id. at 440, 444.
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dard of conduct for corporate fiduciaries but which was restricted to
self-dealing. A middle ground to be considered in the future would
be a statutory rule that requires the adoption of a higher standard in
policing the activities of a corporate fiduciary, but does not restrict
that higher standard solely to self-dealing by a corporate fiduciary,
thus leaving flexibility with the courts to deal with the unique set of
facts presented.
VII. COMMON THREADS THAT CAN BE WOVEN TOGETHER TO
CREATE NATIONAL UNIFORMITY
What we have seen above demonstrates that, while it appears on
the surface that there is great diversity among states regarding the
propriety and the effectiveness of exoneration clauses, in fact, on
closer examination, the decisions of the courts are actually closely
aligned. New York, by statute, strictly regulates the use of exonera-
tion clauses in wills, but the New York courts interpret that statute
as excluding inter vivos trusts, thus narrowing the restrictive effect of
the statute and allowing an entire group of instruments to be drafted
with effective exoneration clauses. New York is the prime example
of a jurisdiction in which there are conflicting policy judgments be-
ing made by the legislature and the judicial system.31"
Texas has enacted and reaffirmed a statute liberally allowing
exoneration clauses.3 19 Yet, Texas-courts have cited the Restatement
moderate position in more than one recent case, demonstrating, like
New York, an internal inconsistency in their overall approach, but,
also like New York, showing a tendency towards a moderation of
their somewhat extreme statutory approach. 2 0 Taken together with
,the general recent trend of states adopting moderate statutes, it ap-
pears that most jurisdictions, even the most extreme, are moving to-
wards a less diverse, more moderate, nationally consistent approach.
Based upon a close examination of the caselaw, the author con-
cludes that if fiduciaries act with culpability beyond mere negli-
gence, regardless of an underlying statute, state courts will attempt
to find a way to limit the effectiveness of exoneration clauses, some-
times despite the plain language of an applicable, inflexible stat-
ute. 21 If fiduciaries are merely negligent or have made mistakes in
318. See supra pp. 126-131.
319. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
320. See supra p. 144-45.
321. The Texas courts are the best example of this tension between a rigid statute and a
court's desire to rule equitably. See supra p. 145.
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judgment, state courts will give effect to an exoneration clause.
Courts are likely to be particularly concerned if the exoneration
clause gets drafted into the will or trust instrument through an abuse
of a fiduciary relationship; a clause may not be given effect based on
those grounds.122 Where state statutes are at inflexible extremes,
state courts must strain to effectuate an equitable result. The present
diversity of statutes only contributes to the difficulty in allowing the
courts to reach fair results.
It would seem appropriate for the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws to consider the topic of exonera-
tion clauses and to promulgate a uniform statute for adoption in all
states. In drafting a uniform rule, the Restatement section 222
might be the best resource with which to begin. The moderate posi-
tion set out in the Restatement provides enough flexibility for courts
to analyze the facts of each case and give effect to an exoneration
clause when it appears as though the fiduciary was not extremely
culpable and when, on balance, it is more appropriate to follow the
intent of the settlor than the strict rules of fiduciary administration.
Special factors to be dealt with in the drafting of a new uniform
statute include the need for safeguards to be sure that the creator of
the instrument is aware of the inclusion and the effect of an exculpa-
tory clause, and the need to consider a higher standard of due care
for corporate fiduciaries.
One improvement in the design of a proposed uniform statute
would be an expanded comments section which could contain sample
forms that would help to guide a draftsperson in clarifying the intent
of the creator of the document. For example, a form could be in-
cluded to show how to clarify that there was a specific request for
the use of an exoneration clause, or, at the very least, that the crea-
tor knew of its existence and did not object to its inclusion. The sam-
ple form could provide a place for the settlor's signature, either on a
separate sheet or within the instrument beside the exoneration
clause. Alternatively, it could be required that an exoneration clause
include a sentence stating that the draftsperson has notified the crea-
tor of the instrument regarding the presence of the clause and that
the creator understands its impact and desires its inclusion.
The creation and widespread adoption of a new statute to regu-
late the use of exoneration clauses can have a most helpful effect on
322. See, e.g., Estate of Lubin, 143 Misc. 2d 121, 539 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
19921
164 HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:123
the fair administration of wills, trusts, and other documents in which
an exoneration clause might be included.
